




TRADE BALANCE CONSTRAINTS AND OPTIMAL REGULATION 
  Omar O. Chisari y Lucía Quesada 















Centro de Estudios Económicos de la Regulación 
Universidad Argentina de la Empresa 
Lima 717 
C1053AAO Buenos Aires, Argentina 




  1Trade balance constraints and optimal 
regulation 
 Omar  O.  Chisari
1 Lucía  Quesada
2
Abstract 
In this paper we develop a model to understand the interactions between 
optimal regulation and external credit constraints. If a big proportion of the 
regulated sector is owned by foreign investors, a credit-constrained country 
who wants to send profits abroad has to generate enough surplus in the trade 
account in order to compensate capital outflows. This may be a real problem 
in developing countries, in which regulated sectors are big and foreign 
ownership is very important. We show that the credit constraint translates 
into a constraint of maximum profits for the regulated firm. As a 
consequence, overall efficiency in the regulated sector is reduced to 
maintain incentive compatibility. With a flexible exchange rate, devaluation 
is an additional instrument to relax the credit constraint, but the country is 
not in general willing to relax it completely. Efficiency is higher than with a 
fixed exchange rate, but it’s still lower than without credit constraints. 
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  21 Introduction 
Regulated sectors share in GDP may be quite big with respect to the economy in 
developing countries. Moreover, the participation of foreign investors in the ownership 
of regulated firms is far from being negligible.  
Can regulations design be considered independently from the external sector 
performance?. Most probably, a regulated firm will want to transfer profits to its foreign 
owners after investing in the host country; but capital outflows have to be compensated 
by inflows, either from the capital account, via borrowing, or from a surplus in the trade 
account. If the country is credit-constrained, the trade account becomes the only means 
the country can use to finance capital outflows. 
On the other hand, domestic ownership is not enough for solving the problem. In 
fact, domestic agents could exhibit a preference for holding foreign assets, putting 
pressure on the trade surplus anyhow. Also, local opportunities for reinvesting profits 
could help reducing or reversing the flow. 
These are intertemporal issues but we will be dealing here with the case of a static 
model. Under this setting the contract obliges the principal to make transactions in a 
subsidiary market to the main relationship. 
A well-known result of the theory of incentives in regulation is that optimal 
regulation under asymmetric information implies leaving rents to efficient firms in order 
to induce them to actually reveal they are efficient (Baron and Myerson, 1982 and 
Laffont and Tirole, 1993). In some cases, these rents may be quite significant. If a big 
proportion of the rents are sent abroad, the country may face a serious problem trying to 
increase its exports of goods and services in order to compensate the capital outflows. In 
particular, a low level of exports may force the country to give lower powered 
incentives and reduce overall efficiency of the regulated sector. 
In this paper we are interested in the interaction between the optimal regulatory 
policy and the constraints imposed by the external sector. In particular, we analyze how 
the optimal regulatory mechanism is modified when the country is credit-constrained
3. 
The case of Argentina is a good example of an economy where the share of regulated 
sector in GDP is important and international credit constraints are binding; that will last 
for several years, and it will probably influence regulatory policy. Moreover, Argentina 
established a currency board regime in 1991 that lasted for ten years, but recently 
announced default of its external debt and highly devaluated its currency.  
To analyze this problem, we develop a very simple and stylized model of a small 
economy of three goods, a tradable good, a non-tradable good and money. We assume 
that the production of the non-tradable good is performed by a regulated natural 
monopoly. The regulated monopoly is privately informed about its marginal cost of 
production and, therefore, an optimal regulation policy will provide the monopoly with 
incentives to reveal its private information. We assume that the country is credit-
                                                 
3 Lewis and Sappington (1998) consider the case of potential operators of unknown ability that are wealth 
constrained. In our case, it is the Principal who must face an additional constraint in a complementary 
good necessary to develop the contract. 
  3constrained in the sense that it cannot borrow money from foreign investor at the 
equilibrium international interest rate. The country is a net exporter of the tradable good 
and the monetary value of exports will determine how binding the credit constraint is.  
In our model, it turns out that the credit constraint traduces in an additional 
constraint on maximum profits for the regulated firm. The level of exports is somewhat 
limited because it depends on the international price of the tradable good and the foreign 
demand function, both variables beyond the control of the country. The credit constraint 
implies that the capital outflows, equal to the proportion of profits sent abroad, cannot 
be higher than the monetary value of exports. It is, therefore, imposing an upper bound 
to the level of profits the firm can earn. We show that the credit constraint has a 
negative impact on the overall efficiency of the regulated sector. Indeed, if the credit 
constraint is binding, the regulator has to reduce the rents given to efficient firms, but, 
due to the incentive problem, it can only do it by reducing production. That is, the 
regulator will be willing to accept an efficiency loss in compensation for a reduction of 
pressure on the trade balance. 
One interesting finding is that the reduction of the level of production is 
concentrated in the inefficient types. The new constraint obliges the principal to 
sacrifice efficiency; since the same set of incentive compatibility and participation 
constraints are still operative, to minimize the loss, transfers are reduced for the most 
efficient type but not her production, and production is reduced for all other types. 
Indeed, there is no point in reducing production of the most efficient firm because rents 
are not affected by it. 
We show that the effect of the credit constraint on efficiency is more important 
the larger the proportion of foreign ownership and the smaller the exchange rate. When 
the proportion of foreign ownership increases, for a fixed level of exports, the 
government is obliged to reduce rents in order to satisfy the credit constraint. Therefore, 
efficiency is reduced further. Similarly, a higher exchange rate raises the value of 
exports, increasing the rents the regulator can offer to the firm. 
Of course, in a flexible exchange rate regime, the trade balance pressure could be 
reduced through devaluation. Indeed, a higher exchange rate increases the monetary 
value of exports, relaxing the credit constraint. However, devaluation is costly, since it 
increases both the domestic price of tradable goods and the domestic value of the 
outside option of the regulated firm. The country, then, faces a trade off when 
determining the optimal exchange rate, so it may not want to completely relax the credit 
constraint. Assuming that the country optimally sets the exchange rate, we show that 
optimal regulation still requires lower efficiency if the cost of relaxing the credit 
constraint completely is high. We also show that the optimal exchange rate is set such 
that the marginal cost of devaluation is equal to its marginal benefit
4. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the model and present 
the main assumptions. In Section 3, we assume that the exchange rate is fixed. We 
obtain the regulatory contract with and without credit constraint and we show that 
production is further reduced when the credit constraint is binding. In Section 4 we 
                                                 
4 Marginal costs of devaluation include the deviation of the real exchange rate with respect to the long-run 
steady state and, in the case of highly indebted country, the marginal fiscal effort needed to collect taxes 
for buying foreign currency to domestic exporters.   
  4assume that the country can optimally determine de exchange rate in order to relax the 
credit constraint. We show that, in general, the country will not devaluate to eliminate 
the constraint, but it will choose the exchange rate for which the marginal cost equals 
the marginal benefit. Finally, we conclude in Section 5. 
2 The  model 
Consider a small economy with a tradable good, good T, a non-tradable 
(regulated) good, good R. The tradable good is produced in a competitive industry, 
through a constant returns to scale technology. This implies that in any equilibrium, the 
profits of the tradable sector are equal to 0. Moreover, the assumption of small economy 
implies that the international price of the tradable good is fixed in the international 
markets and local production cannot influence the equilibrium price. 
The non-tradable good industry is a regulated natural monopoly. The government 
wants to determine the optimal way of designing the regulatory contract in order to 
maximize social welfare. The regulated firm has private information about its 
production technology. The government knows that the cost of the regulated firm is 
  ( ) RR Cq q k θ = + , 
where qR is the quantity produced by the firm, k is a fixed cost and the marginal cost, θ, 
is such that θ ∈ [θL,θH] according to a cumulative distribution function F(θ) with 
density  f(θ). This is common knowledge. We assume that the distribution function 
satisfies the monotone hazard rate property: 






 is increasing in θ. 
We assume that the surplus obtained is large enough so the government wants to 
produce even if the firm turns out to be very inefficient. So, shutting down production is 
never an optimal option. 
The profit of the regulated firm is  
  () ( ) ( ) ,, , ,
d




where pR is the price of the non-tradable good, pT
d is the price of the tradable good and t 
is a transfer from the regulator to the firm (t could be negative, in which case it is a tax 
paid by the firm to the government). The domestic price of the tradable good is 
d
T p ep = , where e is the exchange rate and pT is the international price. 
Domestic and foreign investors own the regulated firm. The proportion of 
domestic capital is α ∈ [0,1]. 
There is a representative consumer with quasilinear, separable preferences, whose 
utility functions is characterized by 
  5  ()( ) ( ) ,, RT R R T T Uq qm m u q u q =+ + , (2) 
where m is the quantity of money consumed by the individual, qT is the quantity of 
tradable good and uk(⋅) is increasing and concave for k = R,T. 
The representative consumer maximizes his utility taking as given the prices of 
the three goods, with the price of money normalized to 1. Demand functions are then 
independent and determined by  ( ) RR qp and  ( )
d
TT qp such that: 
 
































The objective of the regulator is to determine the optimal regulatory policy. The 
regulator determines the quantity to be produced by the regulated firm (or similarly, the 
price of the regulated good) and the transfer to the firm in order to maximize domestic 
social welfare (DW). Domestic social welfare is equal to the sum of the consumer 
surplus and the domestic profits of the regulated firm (remember that firms producing 
the tradable good make 0 profits). We assume that the government has to collect money 
through distortionary taxes in order to subsidize the firm, so in order to give 1$ to the 
firm, consumers have to pay (1 + λ)$ and λ is a measure of the cost of public funds.  
  ( ) ( )
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 (3) 
where V is the gross consumer surplus:  






RR TT qp qp
RT R T Vqq u vd v u zd z ′′ =+ ∫∫  
There are two reasons why the government dislikes rents in this context. First, 
rents are relatively less valuable than consumer surplus because a proportion (1 – α) 
goes to consumers abroad. Second, the government is obliged to distort the economy in 
order to collect money to give rents. Therefore, it is optimal to fix prices above the 
marginal cost in order to save in distortionary taxes. 
3  Fixed exchange rate 
In a context of complete (symmetric) information, the optimal regulatory contract 
would give a rent just enough to make the firm willing to participate whatever his type, 
  6because, as argued before, rents are costly. Capital outflows would be minimal and, 
therefore, the credit constraint would not have an effect on the optimal regulatory 
contract. Thus, the credit constraint becomes relevant only if there is asymmetric 
information, in which case the government finds it optimal to give positive rents in 
order to make the firm reveal his type.  
Assume first that the country has a tight monetary policy in which the exchange 
rate is fixed. The regulator cannot use the exchange rate as an instrument to relax the 
external sector constraint. In this section, we assume that the exchange rate is fixed and 
we normalize it to 1. 
3.1  Benchmark: No credit constraint 
We analyze first, as a benchmark, the case in which the country is not credit 
constraint, but information is still asymmetrically allocated. If the country is not credit-
constrained, it can borrow to compensate any difference between the capital account 
and the trade account. So, the external sector does not impose any constraint on the 
amount of profits the firm can send to foreign owners. The only constraints the 
government has to consider are, then, incentive compatibility and participation 
constraints. 
Invoking the revelation principle, the regulator can restrict attention to incentive 
compatible direct revelation regulatory contracts, that is, regulatory contracts in which 
the firm has to announce its marginal cost and has incentives to announce it truthfully. 
In order to characterize the set of incentive compatible contracts, define 
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 (4) 
Then, incentive compatibility implies that telling the truth is a global maximum: 
  ( ) [ ] argmax , , . LH
θ
θ πθθ θ θ θ ∈∀ ∈
%
%  
Using the envelop theorem, this translates in the first order incentive compatibility 
condition 





π θθ θ θ θ θ
θ
≡= − ∀ ∈ &  (5) 
and the (local) second order incentive compatibility constraint  () () 0 RR qp θ ≤ &  
guarantees that telling the truth is indeed a local maximum. 
The single crossing condition is satisfied, so these two constraints guarantee 
global incentive compatibility. Because we assume that shutting down is not an optimal 
policy, the contract has to satisfy also participation constraints whatever the type of the 
firm: 
  7  ( ) [ ] ,, LH πθ π θ θ θ ≥∀ ∈ ,  (6) 
where π  is the rent of investing anywhere else in the world. 
According to equation (5), in any incentive compatible regulatory contract rents 
are decreasing in θ, so the only relevant participation constraint is  
  ( ) H π θ ≥π  (7) 
Indeed, (5) and (7) imply that all the other participation constraints are satisfied. 
In the next proposition, we describe the optimal regulatory contract when the 
country is not credit-constrained and discuss the effects of foreign ownership. 
Proposition 1. If the country is not credit-constrained, the optimal regulatory policy is 
given by () ( ) ( ,
BB
R q ) θ πθ, such that ∀θ ∈ [θL,θH] 
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Quantities and rents are increasing in the proportion of domestic ownership. 
Proof. The optimal regulatory policy solves the following problem: 
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The participation constraint of type θH is binding at the optimum because rents are 
costly for the regulator (the objective function is decreasing in π). 
Integrating the incentive constraint and using the fact that  ( ) H π θ =π  we get: 
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  8implying that  
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Replacing in the regulator’s objective function, the problem becomes 
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We neglect the constraint and we will check it ex post. 
Using the fact that 
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This is indeed the solution if the quantity profile is decreasing in θ (or the price 
profile is increasing), which is true given the monotone hazard rate property and 
assuming that the demand elasticity, ηR is non-decreasing in θ.  
To prove the comparative static result, notice that, for any θ, 
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<  
where MDW is the domestic welfare modified to incorporate the incentive constraint. 
So, the price is decreasing in α, meaning that quantities are increasing. Finally, rents 
increase when quantities increase, so rents also increase with α.  
The first term in (9) is the Ramsey formula and corresponds to the mark-up over 
marginal costs that would be optimal if the regulator knew the value of θ. Under 
complete information some distortion is optimal because it helps saving on the cost of 
public funds. The second term is the distortion due to informational issues and it 
includes the effect of foreign ownership. As usual, the regulator will distort downward 
all quantities except the quantity assigned to the most efficient type, θL, in order to 
reduce informational rents. No type would like to pretend to be θL, so there is no gain in 
distorting this quantity.  
  9The distortion is larger the smaller α. The proportion α measures how much the 
regulator values the rents given to the firm. The smaller α, the smaller the share of 
domestic capital and, therefore, the smaller the weight of rents in the domestic social 
welfare. As a consequence, the smaller α, the higher the cost in welfare terms of leaving 
rents. Therefore, as α decreases, the benefit of reducing quantities in terms of lower 
rents increases and the regulator finds it optimal to increase distortions in order to 
reduce rents. 
3.2  Optimal contract with credit rationing 
In this section, we look at the more interesting case in which the country is credit-
constrained. We keep the assumption of fixed exchange rate, but we assume now that 
the country has no access to external financing. If the country is credit-rationed, any 
deficit in the capital account must be compensated by a surplus in the trade account. The 
regulated firm’s profits are sent abroad in the proportion (1  − α). This generates a 
deficit in the capital account. We assume that the country can accumulate foreign 
reserves but cannot borrow from foreign investors. 
The country, then, faces the following constraint: 
  () ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) 1, , , o r LH X 1 , X α πθ θ θ θ πθ α −≤ ∀ ∈ ≤ −  (10) 
where  X is the monetary value of exports. In this model, X is a constant from the 
regulator’s viewpoint because the price of the tradable good is fixed in the international 
market and the demand for exports is only a function of the price.
5 This constraint 
implies that the total amount of profits sent abroad has to be smaller than the total 
monetary value of exports of the country whatever the type of the firm.  
The effect of credit rationing is thus, to introduce an upper bound on the rents the 
regulator can give to induce truthful revelation. This will have, of course, huge 
consequences in the optimal regulatory policy, because rents, at the end, are the only 
means the regulator has to give incentives to the firm to reveal its true marginal cost. In 
order to make the problem interesting we assume that  ( )
B
L X π θ < , so the credit 
constraint is binding when the firm is efficient if the proportion of foreign ownership is 
high enough. Otherwise, the regulator could always implement the mechanism of 
Proposition 1 and the credit constraint would have no effect on the regulatory scheme. 
We also assume that  X π > , so that the feasible set is non-empty. 
If  α is close to 1, the credit constraint is not binding, because a very small 
proportion of profits is sent to foreign owners. So, Proposition 1 describes the optimal 
regulatory policy. Nevertheless, for any value of  ( )
B
L X π θ < , there is a value 
α*(X) ∈  [0,1] such that if α < α*(X), the credit constraint becomes binding: the 
benchmark solution does not satisfy the credit constraint for low values of θ. The 
regulator has to change the optimal contract in order to account for the constraint. 
                                                 
5 This is a simplifying assumption that allows us to make the point in a clear and crude way. In a more 
complete model, one can assume, for instance, that the demand for exports is a function of the quality of 
the good and that the government can in some way influence this variable. 
  10One could think that the optimal thing to do is to set the contract as in Proposition 
1 for all types for which the credit constraint is not binding and then, fix the rent for 
efficient types at the value of the constraint. Even though this seems very intuitive, it 
goes against incentive compatibility and, therefore, cannot be implemented. Indeed, 
according to equation (5), the rent schedule has to be decreasing, because the regulator 
still wants the contract to be incentive compatible. Thus, the relevant credit constraint is 
  ( ) ( ) 1 L X , π θ ≤− α
)
 (11) 
which, together with (5) implies that the credit constraint is satisfied for any value of the 
marginal cost. 
Figure 1 shows an example in which α < α*(X). Therefore, the benchmark 
contract, the contract without credit rationing, does not satisfy the credit constraint for 
any  θ < θ*. The regulator has to reduce all rents in order to satisfy both incentive 
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Of course, in order to reduce rents in an incentive compatible way, the regulator 
has to distort further the quantities produced. In the next proposition, we show the 
optimal way to do it. 
Proposition 2. The optimal regulatory scheme when the country is credit-rationed is 
given by  () () ( ,
CC
R q θ πθ such that ∀θ ∈ (θL,θH] 
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where β ≥ 0  is the multiplier of the credit constraint, (11). 
Proof. The optimal regulatory policy solves the following problem 
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The Hamiltonian of the problem is 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )(
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and the Lagrangian is 
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where µ(⋅) is the adjoint function associated with the incentive constraint and ξ(⋅) is the 
multipliers associated to the credit constraints. 
Using the maximum principle we obtain that  







λθ λ θ µ θ
⎡⎤ ∂
=+ − + − = ⎢⎥ ∂ ⎣⎦
,  (16) 
  ( ) () () () 1
L
f , α λθ ξ θµ θ
π
∂
−= − + + =
∂
&  (17) 
  ( ) 0. L µθ =  (18) 
Moreover, the incentive constraint implies that the rent schedule is decreasing, 
meaning that ξ(θ) = 0 ∀θ∈(θL,θH]. 
The presence of constraints on the state variable implies that we need to allow the 
adjoint variable to jump at θL. This implies that from (17) we have that 
  12  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 L F µ θα λ θ µ θ
+ =−+ +  (19) 
where 
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for some β ≥ 0. Of course, if β = 0, µ is a continuous function.  
So, assume β = 0. Then replacing (19) in (16) and rearranging terms gives that 
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β > 0 and the adjoint variable is discontinuous at θL. Moreover, for β > 0, qR(θ) is also 
discontinuous at θL and we obtain equations (12) to (15). 
We still have to prove that the solution satisfies the second order incentive 
compatibility condition. This condition is satisfied for β small or if the density function 
is non-increasing (e.g. with a uniform distribution).  
So, whenever the credit constraint is binding (β > 0),  quantities  are  further 
distorted from the benchmark case. The reason is that, in order to satisfy the credit 
constraint, the regulator is forced to reduce the rents for all types above θ*. However, 
incentive compatibility implies that she has to reduce rents also for types below θ* to 
avoid misreporting, because the rent profile has to be decreasing according to equation 
(5). On the other hand, incentive compatibility implies that the only means the regulator 
has to reduce rents is to reduce quantities.  
An interesting (technical) point is that the optimal production profile is 
discontinuous at θL: 











=> = ∫ θ  
Indeed, all quantities in the interval (θL, θH] are reduced below the benchmark 
level in order to be able to reduce the rent of the most efficient type, and this new 
distortion is independent of the level of efficiency, because the credit constraint is also 
independent of θ. However, at θL it is costless to jump to the first best level of 
  13production because no rents have to be given to more efficient types. Moreover, the 
benefit of the jump is strictly positive because of the increase in allocative efficiency. 
Therefore, assigning the first best production to the most efficient type is always 
optimal. The optimal production schedule is depicted in Figure 2. Notice, however, that 
because types are continuous the probability of observing a θL firm is actually equal to 
0. In a discrete type case, it is easy to verify that the production of the most efficient 
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Figure 2
Proposition 3. If the multiplier of the credit constraint, β, is positive, it decreases with 
the proportion of domestic ownership and with the exchange rate. 
Proof. Equation (12) is satisfied for any α. Therefore, 
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Combining these two things, we have that 









Differentiating equation (13) for  ˆ θ  we obtain that 
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With the same development, we show that  
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  
The multiplier β is a decreasing function of α. The lower α, the more stringent the 
credit constraint and, therefore, the higher the benefit of relaxing it. This implies, in 
particular, that the credit constraint reinforces the effect of α on the optimal price 
schedule. For any θ, the price is decreasing in α because a) rents are less costly the 
larger α (this is the same effect as in the benchmark case) and b) the credit constraint is 
less binding the larger α. Similarly, β is a decreasing function of the exchange rate, 
because a higher exchange rate relaxes the credit constraint, increasing the rents the 
regulator can offer to the firm. 
Of course, the fact that β is positive is completely associated to the asymmetry of 
information. Indeed, if the regulator knew the firm’s marginal cost, no type of firm 
would receive a rent above the outside option, π and, therefore, there would be no need 
to distort quantities. Indeed, in that case, the credit constraint in not binding whatever 
the values of α and θ. 
4  Flexible exchange rate 
The regulator can get an additional degree of freedom if the exchange rate is not fixed. 
In particular, a devaluation increases the domestic value of exports (or decreases the 
foreign value of profits) and, therefore, relaxes the credit constraint. 
Suppose the tradable sector produces with a constant return to scale technology 
but its production is limited by a fixed resource, L, say land. This implies that  
  , TT T yqxL = +≤ 
where yT is the local production of tradable goods. Exports are then limited by the size 
of the resource. If the country wants to relax the credit constraint increasing exports, it 
has to induce a decrease in the local consumption of the tradable good, which is done by 
increasing its price through the devaluation. Devaluation has then two positive effects 
on the credit constraint. It increases the value of each exported unit and increases the 
units exported because it reduces domestic consumption. On the other hand, it increases 
profits in the tradable sector, which are given by 
  ()
[] ( ) ( ) { }
0, max max 0, ,
T
TT T T yL ee p w y e p w π
∈ =− = − L  
  15where w is the unit cost of the resource used to produce the tradable good. To guarantee 
positive production the domestic price of the tradable good has to be larger than w. 
Of course, the regulator has to bear in mind that any devaluation has a negative 
impact on domestic welfare coming from two different fronts. On the one hand, it 
increases the domestic price of tradable goods, reducing the consumer surplus. On the 
other hand, the domestic value of the outside option of the firm increases with the 
exchange rate, so the whole profit profile has to move upwards in order to satisfy the 
new participation constraint. In particular, the participation constraint writes now: 
  ( ) . R e π θπ ≥  
The new credit constraint is 





e πθ θ θ θ
α
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− ] , L H  (20) 
with  
  ( ) ( ) ( ). TT X ep L q e =−  
and we normalize the international price to 1. 
We assume that the exchange rate cannot be contingent on the announced value of 
θ. So we need to assume that, simultaneously with the choice of the regulatory contract, 
the regulator (or better, the government) determines the exchange rate to maximize 
domestic social welfare. 
In order to incorporate all the effects of a change in the exchange rate, we assume 
that devaluating the currency entails a cost C(e), increasing and convex in e. For 
instance, suppose that agents in this country have a stock of debt expressed in foreign 
currency. Then, a higher exchange rate increases the value of the external debt, which 
affects the agents’ welfare in a negative way. We do not explicitly model such an effect, 
but it is certainly not negligible in reality. 




T de q η = −>  the elasticity of domestic demand of the tradable good 
with respect to the exchange rate. In the next proposition we obtain the optimal 
exchange rate and the optimal regulatory policy. 
Proposition 4. a) The optimal exchange rate is given by e* such that 
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⎡⎤ ′ ⎜⎟ +−+ = − + ⎣⎦ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
 (21) 
b) The optimal regulatory contract is the same as in Proposition 2 and the only effect of 
the exchange rate on the incentive scheme is through the value of the multiplier, β. 
Proof. First, remember that the exchange rate modifies the domestic price of the 
tradable goods: 
  16 ,
d
TT p ep e = =  
which affects itself the demand for tradable goods. 
The Lagrangean function is now 
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∫  
and the regulator chooses qR and e, with the constraint that e ≥ w. 
Maximizing type by type with respect to qR gives the same condition as in 
Proposition 2, which proves point b. 
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Now, using the constraint, we also know that 
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The optimal exchange rate is then defined by 
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The interpretation of condition (21) is straightforward. Increasing the exchange 
rate has a cost in terms of lower consumer surplus, because the domestic price of 
tradable goods is higher and in terms of an increase in the outside option of the firm. 
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− −+ , the increase in the upper bound on profits that can be sent by 
foreign owners of the firm evaluated in domestic currency (given by the multiplier, β) 
and the increase in the domestic profits of the tradable sector. So, the optimal exchange 
rate is such that the marginal cost is equal to the marginal benefit.
6
4.1  An illustration: The two-type case 
To give a better idea of the effects of the credit constraint on the optimal contract, 
consider the following example. Assume that 
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The regulator, then maximizes the expected domestic social welfare, defined by 
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The relevant constraints are the incentive constraint of an efficient firm, the 





























From the first order conditions with respect to the exchange rate we obtain  
  ( )( )( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1, TT T qe e e qe e Ce βησ α γ π σ ′ += −− +
7
where  () () 10
T
L
qe e σ =− >  is the ratio of exports on domestic consumption and measures 
the export effort of the country. 
Maximizing with respect to quantities and rents, the other first order conditions 
are 
                                                 
6 The second order condition is satisfied if the demand function for tradable goods and/or the function 
C(e) are convex enough. 
7 Without credit constraints, the optimal exchange rate is such that  ( )( ) ( T Ce qe e γπ σ ′ += ) , so the 
exchange rate is higher when the country is credit-constrained. 











































Both γ and µ are strictly positive, meaning that the incentive constraint of a good 
type and the participation constraint of a bad type are both binding. 
From the first order conditions we have that there is no distortion for the efficient 
type and the intuition for this result is the same as in the continuous case. On the other 
hand, the distortion for the inefficient type, which is positive because the incentive 
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 (22) 
and increases with the multiplier of the credit constraint, β. The qualitative results are, 
therefore, the same as in the case of continuous types. The optimal contract is 
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Figure 3 Figure 3 
  If the country is not credit-constrained, the optimal regulatory policy would be to 
set qH = qH
B. However, the rent that has to be given to the efficient firm is too high and 
the credit constraint becomes binding. Therefore, the regulator is forced to fix the profit 
of the efficient firm at the value of exports, implying that, in order to keep incentives, 
 
8 In this two-type case, it is clear that there is no distortion for the bad type under complete information, 
even if the country is credit-constrained. 
  19the quantity produced by the inefficient firm has to be reduced to qH
C. The quantity 
produced by the efficient firm is still the first-best quantity, because there are no gains 
in reducing it. 
5 Concluding  remarks 
In this paper we have developed a model of optimal regulation in a small open 
economy subject to credit constraints. The model is especially relevant for developing 
countries in which the regulated sector plays an important role and foreign investments 
in the regulated sector are non-negligible. In such a context, credit constraints have an 
additional negative effect on the overall efficiency of the economy beyond the 
traditional ones. Indeed, the country is obliged to reduce production in the regulated 
sector in order to satisfy both incentive and credit constraints. 
The credit constraint puts an upper bound on the level of profits the regulated firm 
can send abroad to foreign owners, determined by the value of net exports. This limits 
the rents the regulator can give to the firm in order to obtain truthful revelation. The 
government is then obliged either to reduce efficiency in the regulated sector or to 
promote exports in order to relax the credit constraint.  
This model constitutes an attempt to include some general equilibrium effects in 
the optimal regulation analysis. This is not a general equilibrium model, but it makes 
the link between regulation and the external sector. In particular, we show that the 
design of the optimal regulatory policy cannot be independent of the performance of the 
external sector if the country has not access to the international credit markets. 
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